The Strategy of Conflict

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" In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling’s work opens to rational analysis as crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrance. In this field, the author’s analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive and most stimulating book on the subject." -Annals of the American Academy " An important contribution to understanding the conduct of the ambiguous conflict between communist bloc on the one hand and the United States and its Free World Allies on the other. " -Journal of Politics.

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Thomas C Schelling is Lucius N Littauer Professor of Political Economy, Hoh F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He is the 2005 Nobel Larueate in Economics. Table of Contents Elements of a theory of strategy The retarded science of international strategy An Essay on bargaining Bargaining, communication and limited war A reorientation of game theory Toward a theory of interdependent decision Enforcement, communication and strategic moves Game theory and experimental research Strategy with a random ingredient Randomization of promises and threats The threat that leaves something to chance Surprise attack: A study in mutual distrust The reciprocal fear of surprise attack Surprise attack and disarmament Appendices: Nuclear weapons and limited war For the abandonment of symmetry in game theory Re-interpretation of a solution concept for "Noncooperative" games.